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We argue that, contrary to standard views of development, children understand the world in terms of hidden,
nonobvious structure. We review research showing that early in childhood, items are not understood strictly
in terms of the features that present themselves in the immediate “here-and-now,” but rather are thought to
have a hidden reality. We illustrate with two related but distinct examples: category essentialism, and atten-
tion to object history. We discuss the implications of each of these capacities for how children determine object
value. Across a broad range of object types (natural and artifactual, real and virtual, durable and consumable),
an item is evaluated very differently, depending on inferred qualities and context. In this way, children’s
early-emerging conceptual frameworks influence how objects attain both psychological and monetary value,
and may have important implications for which messages children find most persuasive.
Keywords Children; Persuasion; Essentialism; Object history; Value; Ownership; Authenticity;
Purity; Contamination; Scarcity; Variety
Introduction
Any economic exchange or system starts with a
determination of object value. Whether trading
baseball cards, selecting a brand of toothpaste, con-
verting currency, or purchasing stocks, effective
decision-making requires first establishing the value
of the objects that surround us. We make these
evaluations quickly and effortlessly, many times a
day. We also have useful heuristics that often allow
us to determine the value of an object at a glance. If
all else were equal, we would place greater value
on a plate of cookies vs. a single cookie, a function-
ing smartphone vs. one with a cracked screen, a
brand-new car vs. an old rustybucket. We have per-
ceptual mechanisms for rapidly assessing amounts,
cleanliness, functionality – all of which contribute
to valuations.
Yet object value can be more than meets the eye.
An item’s value is not always gleaned from a
glance, but rather may reflect features that are hid-
den, nonobvious, or altogether outside the object
per se, such as its provenance, the effort that went
into its creation, or the context in which it appears.
Examples abound. Celebrity possessions, bottled
mountain water, purebred pet breeds, and authen-
tic works of art are all examples where valuation
goes beyond an item’s visible or functional proper-
ties (Bloom, 2010). In each case, there is a layer of
added knowledge or beliefs that shift the item’s
meaning and value: its origins, who has owned it
before, its lineage, its creator. These added layers
help explain why one would offer $5,300 on eBay
for Scarlett Johansson’s used tissue, pay for a bottle
of Evian when a free refill of one’s thermos is avail-
able from a drinking fountain in the same building,
or pay tens of millions of dollars for an original
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What about children? Children are interesting to
study for three primary reasons. First, examining
children lends insight into the processes responsible
for adult patterns of reasoning. It is often difficult,
or even impossible, to determine how a preference
emerges when it is already full-blown in the adult,
but by examining the developmental process, we
can learn its origins, and the mechanisms that con-
tribute to how and why it emerges. Second and
relatedly, children are the consumers of the future,
so examining children provides an opportunity to
study what sorts of interventions may lead to better
outcomes (Kasser & Linn, 2016). For example, if we
wish to teach children to be responsible consumers,
it is important to know if certain early experiences
lead children to be more open to financial educa-
tion, or more at risk to ruinous decision-making.
And third, a tremendous amount of resources go
toward children—by parents, and by children
themselves. Middle-income parents in the United
States spend upwards of six figures per child, from
birth through 17 years of age (Lino, Kuczynski,
Rodriguez, & Schap, 2014). On average, toys alone
account for roughly $500 per year for children in
the United States (NPD Group, n.d.). Children
themselves make purchasing decisions, boasting bil-
lions in spending power (Schor & Henderson,
2008). And companies in turn spend billions mar-
keting to children (Horovitz, 2006). For all these
reasons, it is important to know, for better or
worse, what children find persuasive and of value.
Many theories characterize children as appear-
ance-bound, concrete thinkers, reliant on surface
features, unable to grasp abstractions, and limited
to reasoning about the “here-and-now” (e.g., Rak-
ison & Oakes, 2003). Certainly, there is ample evi-
dence to support such a view. Prior to about 6 or
7 years of age, children routinely fail to appreciate
that physical quantities remain constant over irrele-
vant manipulations (Piaget, 1970). They often make
judgments based on how things appear, rather than
they are—for example, reporting that pouring liq-
uid from a low, squat cup into a tall, thin beaker
increases the amount of liquid, because it looks like
more (as the height increases). Young children have
a tendency to focus on salient features of objects,
such as their shape (Landau, Smith, & Jones, 1988),
and are easily drawn to irrelevant environmental
features (e.g., posters on the wall) even when they
distract from the task at hand (e.g., learning a class-
room science lesson) (Fisher, Godwin, & Seltman,
2014). Their preferences may lack refinement or
sophistication (e.g., a preference for bright colors,
sweet tastes, bouncy music, etc.) (Birch, 1990;
LoBue & DeLoache, 2011; Ventura & Mennella,
2011).
But it would be wrong to infer that children’s
evaluations are limited to considering only the most
salient and obvious features of the world around
them. From a remarkably young age, children can
be subtle and discerning in their judgments. Indeed,
toddlers are infamous for kicking up a fuss when
items deviate even slightly from their preferences
or expectations. For example, anecdotal reports sug-
gest that children resist any modifications to their
special attachment objects (such as a blanket or soft
toy), even objecting when a parent washes or cleans
the item (Winnicott, 1953). One parenting website
notes (Yakomin, 2001): “As soon as your child
shows an attachment to a toy or blanket, it’s wise
to buy an identical spare. Just be sure to switch
them off from time to time. Otherwise they won’t
smell or feel the same, and your child will know
the difference right away.” In the domain of food
as well, picky eaters are notoriously sensitive to
subtle variation in taste, texture, or even arrange-
ment, for example, refusing an otherwise palatable
food if it makes contact with another food on their
plate (Boquin, Smith-Simpson, Donovan, & Lee,
2014).
Our primary goal in this article is to review
when, how, and why children are attuned to non-
visible features of the objects in their world (using
“objects” broadly to include animals, foods, arti-
facts, and ideas). We first focus on two conceptual
orientations that underpin an early incorporation of
the nonobvious: psychological essentialism and
object history. After defining these concepts, we
review a now considerable body of psychological
evidence that these orientations emerge early in
childhood. Then we discuss the implications of
these findings for children’s evaluation of objects.
These implications extend to notions of ownership,
authenticity, purity, contamination, scarcity, and
variety. We conclude that a sensitivity to nonobvi-
ous features emerges early in childhood and perme-
ates children’s object evaluations. Finally, we
summarize and point to important open issues.
Essentialism
Essentialism is a widely held, intuitive belief that
certain categories (especially natural kinds, such as
tigers or gold, and some social categories, such as
gender or race) have an underlying, nonobvious
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reality or true nature (Gelman, 2003). Why do
wolves have sharp teeth, roam in packs, and howl
at the moon? The essentialist response is that there
is some inner quality that every wolf has that
causes these features to emerge inevitably (Gelman,
Meyer, & Noles, 2013). This “wolf essence” is
assumed to be inherent and fixed at birth–perhaps
residing in an animal’s blood or genes (Dar-Nimrod
& Heine, 2011; Heine, Dar-Nimrod, Cheung, &
Proulx, 2017), or perhaps even due to qualities that
are currently unknown and have yet to be discov-
ered (Medin, 1989). On this view, a seemingly inno-
cent wolf cub will inevitably transform into a
ferocious beast, even if it looks like a puppy, even
if it’s raised by humans, and even if it’s wearing
sheep’s clothing. Note that our focus is strictly on
how people think about categories (also known as
“psychological essentialism”; Medin, 1989), and not
metaphysical claims about the structure of the
world (see Gelman, 2003; Wilkins, 2013, for other
senses of “essentialism”).
Essentialism can be a useful heuristic. The idea
that appearances can be deceiving, and that under-
lying shared similarities are more central to an
item’s identity, is a basic insight that accords with
generations of scientific discoveries regarding the
natural world, ranging from gravitational waves, to
genetic structure, to molecular compounds, to neu-
ral activation in the brain. Essentialism may encour-
age even young children to be curious about, and
search for, underlying causal features to account for
observed patterns in the everyday world (e.g., Why
do caterpillars turn into butterflies? What makes
boys and girls different?).
At the same time, essentialism is only a heuristic—
and as with any heuristic, it oversimplifies and mis-
characterizes the world (Gelman, 2003). For example,
the essentialist assumption that a category is stable
over time, and that outward visible changes are only
superficial, leads people to underestimate how vari-
able category members can actually be (even to the
level of their genetics), and to misunderstand theories
of evolution (Gelman & Marchak, in press; Gelman &
Rhodes, 2012; Leslie, 2013; Shtulman & Calabi, 2012).
Essentialist beliefs about social categories can be par-
ticularly misleading. For example, a nationally repre-
sentative survey of 1,200 U.S. adults ages 18–90 found
that most respondents endorsed false essentialist
statements such as “Our genes tell us which race we
belong to” and “Two people from the same race will
always be more genetically similar to each other than
two people from different races” (Christensen, Jayar-
atne, Roberts, Kardia, & Petty, 2010). Similarly, essen-
tialism overestimates the role of causes inherent in
individual category members, downplaying causes
that are outside the individual, such as historical fac-
tors or structural inequalities (Cimpian & Salomon,
2014). It is thus perhaps not surprising that essential-
ist reasoning in adults is linked to a variety of social
consequences, including stereotyping and prejudice
(Bastian & Haslam, 2006), biased categorization of
multiracial individuals (Ho, Roberts, & Gelman,
2015), and gender and race imbalances in academia
(Leslie, Cimpian, Meyer, & Freeland, 2015).
Importantly for current purposes, an extensive
body of evidence has found that children, too,
endorse essentialist beliefs, long before they have
learned about biology or genes in school (Gelman,
2003, 2004; Gelman & Roberts, 2017). By 4–5 years
of age, children judge that an animal cannot change
its category membership, even when it is modified
to look like a different kind of animal (e.g., a porcu-
pine cannot turn into a cactus; Keil, 1989). They
expect that members of the same category will have
a wealth of nonobvious properties in common, even
when category membership competes with appear-
ances (e.g., a blackbird will feed its young the same
kind of food as a flamingo, because they are both
birds, but different food from a bat, because they
are different kinds; Gelman & Davidson, 2013;
Gelman & Markman, 1986). Children predict that
an animal will resemble its birth parents more than
its adopted parents (e.g., a cow raised with pigs
will moo and have a straight tail; a boy raised
exclusively with females will nonetheless have a
desire to play football; Gelman & Wellman, 1991;
Taylor, Rhodes, & Gelman, 2009). They treat cate-
gory boundaries as objectively correct (e.g., the only
correct way to group together a man and two
women is to put the two women together, and it
would not be OK to group the man with one of the
women; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009). They judge that
inherent, internal causes are critical to identity (Die-
sendruck, Gelman, & Lebowitz, 1998; Newman,
Herrmann, Wynn, & Keil, 2008; Taborda-Osorio &
Cheries, 2018).
Essentialist beliefs have been documented
broadly across a range of cultural contexts with
highly varied material cultures and society develop-
ment, from rural Peruvian highlands to the Mongo-
lian steppes to a fishing village in Madagascar (e.g.,
Astuti, Solomon, & Carey, 2004; Deeb, Segall,
Birnbaum, Ben-Eliyahu, & Diesendruck, 2011; del
Rıo & Strasser, 2011; Gil-White, 2001; McIntosh,
2009; Moya, Boyd, & Henrich, 2015; Sousa, Atran, &
Medin, 2002; Tsukamoto, Enright, & Karasawa,
2013; Waxman, Medin, & Ross, 2007). Across these
varied contexts, children and adults alike
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essentialize animal kinds (such as birds, dogs, or
fish), though which social kinds children essentialize
is considerably more variable (e.g., Rhodes & Man-
dalaywala, 2017). For example, the extent to which
children essentialize Catholic vs. Protestant, Jewish
vs. Arab, Brahmin vs. Dalit, or White vs. Black, var-
ies as a function of the community in which they
grow up. For example, children growing up in
Northern Ireland treat religious categories (e.g.,
Catholic, Protestant) in essentialist ways that U.S.
children living in Boston do not (Smyth, Feeney,
Eidson, & Coley, 2017); Israeli Jewish and Arab chil-
dren are more likely to essentialize ethnicity if they
attend mono-cultural versus integrated schools
(Deeb et al., 2011); children growing up in a more
racially and ethnically homogeneous, conservative
community in Michigan developed stronger essen-
tialist beliefs about gender and race than those
growing up in a more racially and ethnically
diverse, liberal community just one hour away
(Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).
To summarize: psychological essentialism is an
early-emerging assumption about natural cate-
gories. Adults and children alike readily construe
the world in terms of hidden, nonobvious structure.
Essentialism also often (though variably) extends to
social kinds such as gender, race, ethnicity, or
wealth (Kraus & Keltner, 2013). In contrast, essen-
tialism does not appear to apply to artifacts: cups
and tables do not have a biological basis, they do
not have hidden innards, they do not have sharp
boundaries, and they have quite limited inductive
potential (Keil, 1989; Rhodes & Gelman, 2009).
Nonetheless, nonobvious properties are important
to artifacts as well, in how we think about object
history. We turn to this point next.
Object History
For 21st century adults, an object’s history—where
it is from, where it has been, and who has owned
it—plays a powerful role in how we think about it.
Consider, for example, a plain, white bag that Neil
Armstrong used on his Apollo 11 mission to the
moon, and that his widow discovered tucked away
in their closet after his death. It is unremarkable in
size or shape, somewhat discolored from dirt, with
a simple zippered closure. Based on looks alone—
revealing ordinary material, simple function, and
dingy appearance—it is mundane at best, perhaps
even edging toward trash. Yet it has been
described thusly: “it is hard to imagine anything
more exciting.” What transforms this object from
ordinary to exciting is its history—it was on the
moon, and indeed it participated in a historic
event: the initial moon landing. This example illus-
trates the more general point, that how we think
about an object is inseparable from what we know
about its past. This is so for rare and expensive
artifacts, such as the moon bag and original art-
work (Bullot & Reber, 2013), as well as mundane
items, such as a baby’s favorite blanket (Gelman &
Davidson, 2016). Whether an item is a treasure or
trash may rest not on its appearance or function,
but its origins, and where it has been (cf. a lock of
your child’s baby hair vs. hair clippings on the bar-
bershop floor). In one striking example, a work of
art actually gained value after it was shredded,
because the shredding was an audacious event ini-
tiated by the artist that was timed to take place
immediately following its purchase at auction
(Loughrey, 2018).
As noted earlier, object history is distinct from
essentialism: object history is an acquired feature
distinctive to an individual and applicable to arti-
facts, whereas essence is an inherent, inborn feature
shared by all members of a natural category.
Nonetheless, the two concepts have key similarities
(Gelman, 2013; see also Newman, 2016, for an addi-
tional proposal linking essentialism to artifacts).
Like essentialism, history is nonobvious (it can be
difficult to detect whether a painting is original or a
reproduction; Bloom, 2010), persistent (an object
once associated with a negative owner or event has
a taint that cannot be easily removed; Nemeroff &
Rozin, 1994), and causally powerful (e.g., in some
belief systems, contact with sacred objects has heal-
ing power; Gelman & Hirschfeld, 1999). Many
aspects of adult reasoning reflect an attention to
object history, including legal judgments (determin-
ing who has rightful possession of an item), cultural
institutions (including museum displays and sacred
religious artifacts), psychiatric disorders (such as
hoarding), and of course economic value (more on
this later). People are able to detect history in
objects at a glance—for example, upon seeing a
dented can, they immediately infer a prior denting
event (e.g., that the can was dropped; Leyton,
1992). They judge whether an item is authentic
based on its provenance (Newman & Bloom, 2012).
They have powerful emotional responses when an
item has previously been in contact with a negative
entity (e.g., Hitler; a cockroach) (Nemeroff & Rozin,
1994).
Importantly, starting early in development, chil-
dren, too, are sensitive to object history. Preschool
children use historical cues to make judgments
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regarding whether something is owned as well as
who owns it. These cues include: who had the
object first, who gave permission, which exchanges
took place, and how much effort went into making
it (e.g., Friedman, Neary, Defeyter, & Malcolm,
2011; Kanngiesser, Gjersoe, & Hood, 2010). For
example, 3- and 4-year-olds judged that a piece of
clay that initially belonged to one person, would
now belong to someone else, if that person had
invested creative labor (e.g., transforming the clay
from a duck to an elephant). Control conditions
demonstrated that creative labor was critical to chil-
dren’s judgments, because merely holding the clay,
or making a small action on it (e.g., cutting off a
small piece) did not transfer ownership. When chil-
dren invest creative labor in a toy, they also value
it more highly (sometimes known as the IKEA
effect; Marsh, Kanngiesser, & Hood, 2018).
Four- and five-year-old children also make the
reverse inference: noting history to explain why
someone owns something (Nancekivell & Friedman,
2014). Even when making judgments of what a
given object is, children consider the process that
went into its creation, specifically the creator’s
intent (Gelman & Bloom, 2000). For example, paint
that was intentionally applied to a canvas is consid-
ered a painting, whereas paint that was accidentally
spilled onto a canvas is not – even when the result-
ing image is identical. Object history, in the form of
prior contact with a contaminated item, also affects
preschool children’s explanations and predictions.
Preschoolers supply contamination-based explana-
tions and invoke unseen mechanisms, such as
germs or contact through bodily fluids, to account
for biological consequences such as illness (Kalish,
1996; Legare, Wellman, & Gelman, 2009).
By 5–6 years of age, aspects of object history
affect children’s food choices as well (DeJesus,
Shutts, & Kinzler, 2015). For example, DeJesus and
colleagues presented children with two identical
foods, one of which appeared to be contaminated
(by sneezing or licking) and the other of which did
not. Children were given 30 s to eat as much as
they wished of each food, and then were asked to
rate how “yummy” each food was. Three- and
four-year-old children did not differentiate the two
foods, but by 5–6 years of age, children ate substan-
tially more of the “clean” food than the “contami-
nated” food, and also rated the “clean” food as
much yummier than the “contaminated” food.
Preschoolers also use spatiotemporal history,
rather than appearance or proper name, as the basis
for identity judgments (Gutheil, Gelman, Klein,
Michos, & Kelaita, 2008). For example, 4- and 5-
year-old children were introduced to two identical
Winnie-the-Pooh dolls, one of which was in the
room when the child drew a picture, and the other
which was brought into the room only after the
child had drawn the picture. When asked if the sec-
ond doll knew what the child had drawn, they
responded “no”—only the doll that had been in the
room would have access to this knowledge, even
though the dolls had the same name and same
appearance.
In sum, children’s object concepts incorporate
their knowledge of an object’s history, and this can
be seen broadly in their judgments of ownership,
categorization, identity, and causal reasoning. They
see objects around them not merely as a collection
of shapes, colors, affordances, and functions, but
also as repositories of their history. Putting together
the evidence from both essentialism and attention
to object history, humans appear to have an early-
emerging, domain-general capacity to represent the
environment (human-constructed as well as natural)
in terms of hypothesized, nonvisible features.
Implications for Object Value
To this point, we have characterized children’s con-
cepts as incorporating nonobvious features, includ-
ing essences and object history. For the remainder
of the article, we address the implications of this
perspective for object value. Below we summarize
the findings of controlled experiments that examine
when and why nonobvious features inflate or
deflate an object’s value relative to its material or
functional worth. We explore this issue with regard
to four interrelated set of concepts: ownership and
investment; authenticity; purity and contamination;
and scarcity and variety. Where available, we pro-
vide evidence from children; in other cases, we
review findings with adults and point to where
developmental evidence is lacking.
Ownership and Investment
Ownership is a pure case of object history, invisi-
bly linking object and owner by virtue of the past.
Ownership does not inhere in an object, and cannot
even be detected in an object, but rather derives
from who made it, who bought it, or who received
it as a gift. As Snare (1972) put it, “a stolen apple
doesn’t look any different from any other” (p. 200).
Indirect evidence that ownership imparts value
to young children can be seen in their efforts to
track and enforce ownership relations. By preschool
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age, children demonstrate a keen attention to the
unseen links between owners and possessions. For
example, in one paradigm, young children (2, 3,
and 4 years of age) were shown sets of objects,
three at a time. First the researcher provided own-
ership information about each object (e.g., “This is
yours; this is mine; look at this”), then the location
of the objects was scrambled, as in a shell game,
and finally the child was asked to point to which
item was theirs and which was the researcher’s
(Gelman, Manczak, & Noles, 2012; Gelman, Noles,
& Stilwell, 2014; Noles, Gelman, & Stilwell, in
press). By 3 years of age, children accurately
pointed to which of the choices was theirs and which
was the experimenter’s—even when the three objects
in the set were identical (e.g., three identical toy
cars), or when the child had been assigned the least
appealing object (e.g., a small, plain piece of wood,
alongside two colorful plastic toys). Tagging an
object with ownership information (e.g., “This is
yours”) distinctively elicits these tracking behaviors;
providing a nonownership label (e.g., “This is a
sarn”) does not (Gelman et al., 2014). In this
way, ownership information may bias children’s
allocation of attention (see also Ashby, Dickert, &
Gl€ockner, 2012, for relevant data with adults).
In addition to tracking an object’s spatiotemporal
history, preschoolers search for hidden and invisible
cues to its past (searching for hidden or invisible
markings, akin to dusting for fingerprints) (Gelman,
Manczak, Was, & Noles, 2016). For example, in one
task, a researcher placed two identical objects (e.g.,
two disks) on a turntable, told the child that one of
the objects was their own (“This is yours; this is for
[child’s name]”), pretended to mark it with a pencil
in a hidden place (e.g., on its underside), and then
covered up the display with a lid and spun the
turntable so that the child could not use spatiotem-
poral tracking to determine which object was
which. The researcher then lifted the lid and said,
“Can you find which one is yours?” Children as
young as three years of age searched for the hidden
pencil mark, which was either hidden or altogether
invisible (i.e., no mark was actually made). These
traces were perceptually subtle (either hidden or
altogether invisible), functionally insignificant, and
not directly queried (e.g., the experimenter did not
ask, “Which did I mark?”). Nonetheless, children
actively attended to the differential histories of the
items and spontaneously determined that they were
relevant to ownership.
Ownership information also has consequences
for how young children control and interact with
objects. By three years, for example, children
enforce the ownership rights of others, such as
protesting a third party’s misuse of an object (Ros-
sano, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011). In one study,
an object (e.g., a hat) was explicitly labeled as
belonging either to the child or to one of the experi-
menters, and then a puppet brazenly took the
object without permission and placed it in his bag,
and later still, the puppet threw the hat in the trash.
Children expressed their displeasure by multiple
means, including explicitly normative statements
(e.g., “You must not do that,” imperative protests
(e.g., “Leave the hat on the table”), physical protest
(trying to grab the hat away from the puppet), or
indirect implications (e.g., “Your mum gets angry”).
Even when ownership rights would have no mate-
rial consequences (e.g., the exchange of identical
objects), children protest unauthorized exchanges,
indicating their view that owned objects are non-
fungible (McEwan, Pesowski, & Friedman, 2016),
and this is so even when exchanges are mutual,
accidental, or deceptive (Noles, Gelman, & David-
son, 2017).
Children’s evaluations of objects are also directly
influenced by their beliefs about ownership, as well
as how much time, energy, or creative labor has
been invested in an object. One way this can be
seen is with young children’s attachment objects—
typically soft items, such as blankets and plush
toys, that are specially and intensely preferred
above and beyond all others. Reports estimate that
approximately 60% of middle-class children in the
United States have nonsocial attachments objects,
and by 4–5 years, many children believe that they
have a shared history with their attachment object
extending back to infancy (“I’ve always had Blan-
kie”), and that they gave the object its name
(Lehman, Arnold, & Reeves, 1995).
Work in this area has also shown that forming
attachments to objects influences subsequent chil-
dren’s selections and evaluations among owned
items and their replacements. For example, in one
clever study, preschool-aged children were told of a
duplicating machine that could make exact replicas
of objects (Hood & Bloom, 2008). After seeing a
demonstration with a lab toy, children were asked
if they would prefer their own object (brought from
home) or its exact duplicate. (Children had brought
with them either their attachment object [if they
had one], or any object from home that they liked
[if they did not have an attachment object].) Those
without an attachment object tended to choose the
duplicate of their toy from home, presumably due
to its novelty and “wow” factor. In contrast, not
only did 4–5-year-old children with an attachment
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object strongly prefer the original, but also most
would not even let the experimenter place their
attachment object in the machine. In a follow-up
study, older children (6–7 years) were queried
about nonattachment objects that either did or did
not have a distinctive history. In that study, chil-
dren placed higher values on nonattachment
objects, but only when they had a distinctive, spe-
cial history (e.g., British children preferred a metal
spoon once owned by the Queen to its exact dupli-
cate); not for objects that were also said to be spe-
cial, but were lacking distinctive history (a spoon
made of a precious metal versus its duplicate).
By three years of age, not only do children prefer
an original object to its exact duplicate, they also
prefer an old, visibly worn original object to a more
attractive, brand-new replacement that was
matched in type and features (e.g., old, scuffed, dis-
colored stuffed animal vs. brand-new version of the
same toy; Gelman & Davidson, 2016). Furthermore,
they appreciate that this preference reflects a special
person–object link, applying only to the child-
owner and not to the researcher, whom they judged
would prefer the newer object. Relatedly, children’s
preference for a favorite owned object seems related
to their sense of self: experimentally increasing a
child’s self-worth via feedback on an experimental
task led children to be more willing to part with
the object, but had no effect on their willingness to
part with ordinary, nonvaluable objects (Diesen-
druck & Perez, 2015). Diesendruck and Perez (2015)
also found that removing traces of the self by
means of a thorough cleaning led children to be
more willing to lend the favorite object to a morally
negative character. Altogether, these findings sug-
gest that for young children, owned objects are
treated as containing components of the self, as has
been argued for adults (Belk, 1988).
The value of ownership has also been studied
extensively with the endowment effect—the phe-
nomenon whereby people ascribe greater value to
items they own (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,
1991; see also Gal & Rucker, 2018, for debates
regarding how to interpret this effect). Though the
endowment effect has received much attention in
adults, relatively less attention has been paid to the
question of when this emerges in development.
This is an important question, as it provides infor-
mation regarding how foundational the endowment
effect is, and what experiences are required for it to
appear. Early work in this area with children
observed the endowment effect in children as
young as kindergarten, with no attenuation of the
effect across the age range through adulthood
(Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 2001). In more
recent work, children as young as two years were
shown to prefer objects assigned to them more than
those which were identical but not assigned to
them (Gelman et al., 2012; Noles et al., in press).
For example, when an experimenter provided a
child with sets of three identical objects, labeled
them with contrasting ownership information
(“This is mine; this is yours; look at this”), and then
scrambled their location, children who were 2, 3, or
4 years of age selected the one that had been
assigned as belonging to them as the one they liked
best. This result suggests that either an endowment
effect or mere ownership effect may emerge in the
preschool years. Other work has found that when
3- and 4-year-old children were primed to focus on
the self by creating a self-portrait, they evaluated
their own toys more positively as compared to a
nonself-focused task (e.g., creating a picture of a
friend, or of a farm scene) (Hood, Weltzien, Marsh,
& Kanngiesser, 2016). Similarly, children show an
“IKEA effect” (Norton, Mochon, & Ariely, 2012),
whereby they place greater value on items for
which they have invested their own labor (Marsh
et al., 2018). For example, children who created a
toy preferred it over an identical toy that they did
not create; this effect was not obtained for a toy
that they simply interacted with or drew a picture
of (Marsh et al., 2018).
Even preparing one’s own food leads children to
consume more than another, equivalent food that
was prepared by someone else (DeJesus, Gelman,
Herold, & Lumeng, 2019). For example, in the
study by DeJesus et al., parents brought children
into lab where a researcher read aloud instructions
for how to prepare a food by combining a set of
prepared ingredients (e.g., for making a salad, chil-
dren individually added into a bow: chopped
romaine lettuce, shredded carrots, cooked peas,
croutons, and ranch dressing). Children were then
presented with the serving of food that they had
prepared and an identical serving that someone else
had prepared, side-by-side, and were permitted to
eat as much of each as they wanted. Children ate
nearly twice as much of the food they had prepared
than the other food—a finding that held up
whether the food was a salad or a dessert (DeJesus,
et al., 2019).
In an increasingly digital world, where money
and possessions may be virtual rather than physi-
cally instantiated, it is of particular interest to exam-
ine whether ownership effects carry over to
intangible items, such as ideas or information. This
is an emerging field in which technology is rapidly
Children and Object Value 315
changing and much has yet to be known. Intrigu-
ingly, however, by 6–8 years of age, children attri-
bute ownership to ideas (Shaw, Li, & Olson, 2012),
and by age 6, children prefer pictures containing
their ideas to those containing their labor (Li, Shaw,
& Olson, 2013). In one study, children 4 to 6 years
of age heard a vignette about two girls, Sally and
Anna, who each contributed to making a picture:
one came up with the idea, and the other did the
drawing. When asked who should get to take the
picture home, 4-year-olds selected the person who
drew the picture, but 6-year-olds selected the one
who thought up the idea. However, it remains
unclear how ownership over an idea influences its
value relative to another idea. Is an idea subject to
the same pricing asymmetry observed with tangible
objects? Do we expend more energy defending a bad
idea if it is ours, or show a reluctance to share it?
Relatedly, an open question is when and under
what circumstances people have a sense of owner-
ship over their personal data (Kamleitner &
Mitchell, in press). In contrast to children’s preco-
cious attention to ownership of physical objects,
and somewhat later but relatively early attention to
ownership of ideas, it may take years for children
to develop a sense of ownership of, and value in,
their personal data, such as where their possessions
are located. In a recent study, children 4–10 years
of age and adults were asked whether it was okay
for someone to use a mobile GPS device to track
the location of possessions that were either their
own or belonging to another (Gelman, Martinez,
Davidson, & Noles, 2018). Although both children
and adults viewed object tracking more acceptable
for owners than nonowners, there was a stark
developmental difference in their overall evalua-
tions. Adults (but not children) viewed someone
else tracking another person’s possessions as bad.
Adults expressed strong moral evaluations that
people do not have the right to track possession
belonging to another, whereas children focused
more on the potential benefits of digital object
tracking (e.g., being able to find a lost item). Chil-
dren’s acceptance of virtual object tracking may
have implications for how children come to value
information about others, a topic ripe for investiga-
tion given recent events and trends (e.g., targeted
online manipulation techniques, “fake news”).
Authenticity
Authenticity is an elusive, multifaceted concept,
yet illustrates the role of essence and object history
in determining an item’s value (Newman, 2016;
Newman & Smith, 2016). Animals are authenticated
by having the right “bloodlines” (AKC), artwork is
authenticated by having the right provenance, and
artifacts are authenticated by having participated
directly in a significant prior event. The authentica-
tion of items is analogous to the chain of custody
involving evidence in a criminal trial, requiring
experts, documentation, and an unbroken connec-
tion to an invisible past.
That authentic objects are valued (and not simply
perceived as different) can be seen in the cultural
practices, monetary valuations, and normative eval-
uations that accompany such items. For example,
an original dish from the Titanic was placed on dis-
play in the Detroit Museum of Science; a strand of
pearls once owned by Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis
was sold by Sotheby’s for many times their objec-
tive worth; and a stamp bearing the image of a
replica Statue of Liberty (in Las Vegas), rather than
the original, led to at least one outraged editorial
calling for the stamp’s cancellation (New York
Daily News, 04.16.11). The price of jewelry reflects
its origins, above and beyond its appearance (e.g.,
gold vs. pyrite) or even substance (natural vs. lab-
produced diamond; natural vs. cultured pearl). Sub-
stances lacking these authentic origins are deemed
“fake” or “not real.” Similarly, items in the living
world are commoditized based on their origins or
familial roots, leading to purebred dogs costing
thousands of dollars, or stud fees for racehorses
that are upwards of a quarter of a million dollars.
For brands of wines, heritage and pedigree are
stated as important values (Beverland, 2006).
These judgments are not just the province of the
elite, the snobbish, or those with money to burn. To
the contrary, ordinary adults uniformly agree that a
range of historical circumstances lend objects
authenticity and higher valuations. In one study
(Frazier, Gelman, Wilson, & Hood, 2009), college
students in the United States and England were
asked to say how much a variety of authentic and
inauthentic objects were worth, including original
creations (e.g., the very first lightbulb), items linked
to a famous event (e.g., a chunk of the Berlin Wall),
spatially distant items (e.g., dust from Mars), tem-
porally distant items (e.g., a one-penny piece from
1920), and items with notable ownership history
(e.g., gum chewed by Britney Spears). Every
authentic item was judged to be more valuable than
an ordinary counterpart that was lacking in special
history (e.g., the lightbulb over the kitchen table; a
chewed-up piece of gum on the bottom of your
chair; a piece of concrete from a local construction
site).
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The added value given to authentic objects can-
not wholly be explained as a rational economic
assessment of market forces, such as a monetary
boost deriving from increased status (e.g., if I buy
this authentic object, I will signal that I am a person
of taste and refinement). People not only provided
higher monetary assessments, but also reported that
they more wanted to own and touch the authentic
items—behaviors suggesting that the authentic
objects have personal value (Frazier et al., 2009).
Similarly, Newman, Diesendruck, and Bloom (2011)
found that for celebrity memorabilia, sterilizing
an item reduced its value, whereas priming conta-
gion sensitivity increased its value. Again, these
manipulations should not have affected value if this
were a rational economic judgment; instead, they
are consistent with the notion that an item’s history
persists in the object in some ineffable way. Similar
judgments were seen in an analysis of actual celeb-
rity auctions: the judged likelihood of physical con-
tact between the celebrity and the item predicted
how much people paid for it at auction – positive
in the case of “positive” celebrities (e.g., President
John F. Kennedy), and negative in the case of the
one “negative” celebrity (Bernie Madoff) (Newman
& Bloom, 2014). In short, people act as if an item’s
history carries with it an invisible trace of its prior
owner.
Children, too, place greater value on objects
owned by a celebrity (Frazier & Gelman, 2009). In
one study (Gelman, Frazier, Noles, Manczak, & Stil-
well, 2015), children 4–12 years of age were asked
how much people would pay for each of a series of
items presented in pairs, matched in appearance
but varying in authenticity (e.g., President Obama’s
flag pin vs. the experimenter’s father’s flag pin).
The authentic objects included possessions of
famous individuals with which children were famil-
iar (e.g., a rubber ducky owned by Ernie from
Sesame Street), original creations (e.g., the very first
teddy bear), personal possessions (e.g., the partici-
pant’s grandfather’s baseball glove), and items that
were merely old (e.g., an old book). By 5 years of
age, young children consistently placed greater
monetary value on celebrity possessions than their
matched nonspecial counterpart. For example, the
mean value children placed on the ordinary flag
pin was $98, whereas the mean value they placed
on President Obama’s flag pin was $62,657. In con-
trast, they did not place any greater value on origi-
nal creations (whereas adults did so), suggesting
that contact with a special individual may be the
foundation for the value placed on authentic
objects. Similar developmental findings emerged
when children were asked to judge which items
belong in a museum, with preschoolers making this
evaluation for objects owned by famous individu-
als, but the scope of authenticity broadening with
age, to include original creations (kindergarten) and
personal associations (fourth grade). This result
could not be attributed to item desirability, as
throughout the age range studied, children judged
that even undesirable items belonged in a museum,
if authentic. These findings demonstrate a nascent
sense of authenticity, though many questions
remain regarding the mechanisms underlying chil-
dren’s early sensitivity to items with famous own-
ers, the mechanisms responsible for developmental
change, and the source of cultural variation in these
judgments (e.g., Gjersoe, Newman, Chituc, & Hood,
2014).
Purity and Contamination
Eden foods, an organic food company based in
the United States advertises as offering “authentic,
organic, traditional, pure foods.” As this example
illustrates, the terms authenticity and purity may be
used interchangeably, yet purity implies a distinc-
tively moral component (Rottman & Kelemen,
2012). In this section, we consider how moral con-
siderations tied to concepts of purity and contami-
nation affect item evaluations.
We start with perhaps the starkest intersection of
contamination and morality, namely, the case of
human body parts and substances. Although not
legally for sale, and not products in the usual sense,
bodily materials (e.g., blood transfusions, organ
transplants, and genetic material) are of particular
interest as they provide a direct test of whether
people believe that a person’s essence includes
moral attributes. To the extent that moral qualities
are part of a person’s essence, they should be
viewed as inherent within the individual, contained
within their body, and causally powerful—hence,
transferrable to others with the transfer or trans-
plantation of core internal parts. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, given the absence of scientific basis for such
beliefs, this indeed seems to be the case, both for
many who actually receive transplants (e.g., Sanner,
2001) and those who have not. Thus, for example,
adults are uncomfortable with the idea of receiving
blood transfusions or organ transplants from some-
one with morally negative characteristics, such as
a murderer (Hood, Gjersoe, Donnelly, Byers, &
Itajkura, 2011; Meyer, Leslie, Gelman, & Stilwell,
2013), and both children and adults find it plausible
that moral qualities of the donor (positive or
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negative) will be transmitted to the recipient
(Meyer, Gelman, Roberts, & Leslie, 2017; Meyer
et al., 2013). For example, in one study (Meyer
et al., 2017), children 5–7 years of age were asked
to consider a series of hypothetical vignettes in
which they were asked what would happen if they
were to swap hearts with another individual—ei-
ther another animal (pig or monkey) or another
person with a distinctive character trait (mean, nice,
smart, or not-smart). To make the task child-
friendly, participants were assured that the heart
exchange did not hurt. Across the full set of vign-
ettes, children reported that if they were to receive
the heart of another individual, they would take on
that individual’s characteristics. For example, if they
received a mean child’s heart, they would become
meaner as a result (Meyer et al., 2013, 2017).
Turning to the domain of food, adults’ judg-
ments of naturalness and purity reflect an item’s
history—at times even more than content (Rozin,
2005). Foods that are natural, organic, and ethically
sourced may receive a boost in value, whereas pro-
cessed or genetically modified food (GMO) may
invite suspicion. As with the work reviewed on
organ transplants, these phenomena are of particu-
lar interest, given that people’s beliefs and expecta-
tions may exceed known scientific differences. For
example, GMOs are widely viewed as dangerous
by the generic public, with concerns raised about
health and environmental consequences, yet the sci-
entific consensus is that they are not any less (or
more) safe than other sorts of crops. It has been
hypothesized that psychological essentialism con-
tributes to these concerns (Blancke, Van Breusegem,
De Jaeger, Braeckman, & Van Montagu, 2015). For
example, people are warier of organisms that
include DNA from distinct kinds (e.g., tomato/fish)
than those including DNA from different subtypes
within a kind (e.g., two kinds of tomato) (Gaskell,
Stares, Allansdottir, Allum, & Castro, 2010), and
often falsely believe that properties of the organism
will carry over (e.g., agreeing with the statement,
“Tomatoes modified with genes from a catfish
would probably taste fishy”; Hallman, Hebden,
Cuite, Aquino, & Lang, 2004). Opposition to GMOs
is often moralized; for example, those who oppose
GMOs often agree that they should be prohibited
“no matter how great the benefits and minor the
risks from allowing it” (Scott, Inbar, & Rozin, 2016).
The role of history in the evaluation of foods is a
relatively recent area of research and to our knowl-
edge has not yet been examined developmentally.
Given that even adults show substantial variability
in their knowledge, beliefs, and support or
opposition to different food origins, this raises inter-
esting questions regarding the source of such differ-
ences, and whether they are transmitted through
conversations with parents, and/or through paren-
tal behaviors (e.g., the foods they buy). Given that
children do not show disgust reactions until middle
childhood (see Rottman, DeJesus, & Gerdin, 2018,
for review), we may see a protracted development
of purity and contamination effects on item value.
A final interesting case of contamination and
moral evaluation involves money. Money is
designed to be fungible—that is, to participate in
exchanges that erase its origins and history. A dol-
lar is a dollar, regardless of who used it last. Inter-
estingly, however, even adults attend to the moral
history of money, failing to treat money as just
coldly instrumental. We see this in expressions such
as “honest dollar” (one that is earned through hard
work), “dirty money” (obtained through disrep-
utable means), or “money laundering” (to erase
traces of moral history). Extensive research shows
that people’s mental accounting takes moral origins
into consideration (Zelizer, 1994) and that evalua-
tions of money are also affected by moral origins
(Stellar & Willer, 2014). Moreover, adults’ judg-
ments of money are thought to physically cling to
the dollars that participated in the moral event
(Tasimi & Gelman, 2017; Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013).
For example, in one series of studies (Tasimi &
Gelman, 2017), participants were asked to imagine
that they had been offered a dollar that was stolen
(“Frank found a stolen dollar in his desk. Frank
says you can have the dollar, if you want.”), or a
dollar that was not stolen but offered by a thief
(“Paul stole a dollar from another person. The dol-
lar that he stole is in his pocket. Paul has another
dollar that he did not steal, in his desk. Paul says
you can have the dollar in his desk, if you want.”).
The moral history of the money (stolen or not) was
judged to be more important than the morality of
the giver (thief or not). Adults would rather have a
“clean” dollar from a thief, than a stolen dollar that
someone found—even in contexts where there
would be no punishment or material consequences.
In effect, they reported that if a thief were in pos-
session of a “dirty” dollar and a “clean” dollar,
these two bills would be importantly different.
Strikingly, adults were generally accepting of taking
a dollar from someone who stole a dollar. Addi-
tionally, increasing the offer from $1 to $100 had no
effect on the likelihood of accepting a stolen dollar,
though it did increase the likelihood that they
would accept a physically dirty dollar, perhaps
indicating the moral taint is absolute, whereas
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physical taint can be removed. Altogether, these
results reveal that adults have a robust tendency to
evaluate money based on its moral history. At the
same time, it is notable that there were marked
individual differences as well, with about half the
participants rejecting the stolen money and about
half accepting it. Moreover, developmental evidence
suggests that this response does not emerge until
about 8 years of age (Tasimi & Gelman, 2016). In
future research it would be important to examine
developmental, individual, and group-level factors
that might increase or decrease sensitivity to purity
and contamination in object evaluation.
Scarcity and Variety
A final set of example of how an object’s value
may extend beyond its apparent features concerns
the role of the context. The question we pose here is
whether an item’s context, in the form of the choices
available, may systematically shift its value. To put
it simply and concretely: are there contexts in which
a child whose favorite color is blue nonetheless
would prefer red over blue? We consider two sorts
of contexts that have been proposed in the literature
to play a role, namely scarcity and variety.
Scarcity refers to the relative infrequency of an
item—either within the immediate context (e.g., 1
green marble in a bag that also contains 5 yellow
marbles) or more broadly (e.g., a piece of Tanzanite,
which is rare in the world). Commodity theory sug-
gests that scarce items should be valued more than
nonscarce items: “Any commodity will be valued to
the extent that it is scarce, unavailable, or difficult
to attain” (Brock, 1968, p. 246). Under a strict inter-
pretation of this theory, the green marble in the
example above should be valued more than the yel-
low marbles, given its relative scarcity; however,
the evidence with adults is mixed (see Lynn, 1991,
for a review). On the one hand, adults have been
shown to prefer scarce items to more abundant
options (e.g., Worchel, Lee, & Adewole, 1975); how-
ever, more often than not, some additional informa-
tion (e.g., market concerns, such as demand or
price) or personality lever is needed to boost values
and selections. As one example of this, Verhallen
and Robben (1994) found that adults placed higher
values on popular scarce items vs. accidentally
scarce items. In other cases, selection of scarce items
has been linked to personality characteristics such
as uniqueness seeking (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980).
We have conducted a series of experiments with
children 4–12 years of age and adults, providing
sets of novel objects and giving participants an
opportunity to select one item for themselves or
another person (Echelbarger & Gelman, 2017). Each
set included two types of simple, novel artifacts
(which we can refer to as A and B). On some trials
one item was scarce (e.g., 1 A and 5 Bs, or 2 As
and 4 Bs); on other trials, neither item was scarce
(e.g., 3As and 3Bs). (Which item was scarce vs.
abundant was counterbalanced across sets and
across participants.) No other information was pro-
vided about the items. If children have an intuitive
tendency to value scarce items, then they should
have consistently selected the scarce item above
chance. However, we found little evidence for a
scarcity preference—in children or adults. The only
context in which scarcity was preferred (and then
only weakly) was in the context of social compar-
ison: when items were maximally scarce (5:1 ratio),
participants were more likely to select the scarce
item for themselves than for someone else—though
still at low rates.
We propose that children are not motivated to
select scarcity in and of itself (i.e., there is not a direct
motivation for scarcity), but rather that scarcity may
emerge as a result of other factors (i.e., it is a derived
motivation). For example, scarcity may be valued in
contexts that signal that a scarce item is authentic,
prestigious, or a sign of one’s own uniqueness. Simi-
larly, scarcity may obtain value when the underlying
market forces are explicitly provided. For example,
preliminary evidence from our lab suggests that chil-
dren may reason that items that are scarce due to
their popularity are more valuable than items that
are scarce due to an accidental break in the supply
chain (Echelbarger & Gelman, 2018). Another
derived motivation may stem from the fact that in
some cases, selection of a scarce item is confounded
with selection of a varied set of items (e.g., Chernyak
& Sobel, 2016). We turn next to variety.
In sharp contrast to children’s relative indiffer-
ence to scarcity per se, we have found evidence for
a powerful variety preference in young children
(Echelbarger & Gelman, 2017). By variety, we mean
selecting differences among items within sets. For
example, a set containing yellow and green marbles
is more varied than a set containing just green mar-
bles. Appeals to variety are well-documented in
adults (see Kahn, 1995, for a review), who have
been shown to prefer variety, even in cases where
it requires foregoing some preferred experience
(e.g., Read & Loewenstein, 1995). For example,
when given an opportunity to pick two candies,
when the choices included both Snickers and Twix,
adults typically picked one of each, even when
explicitly providing a preference for one (e.g., “I
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was considering past experiences with the candy
bars, and I took into consideration my enjoyment of
Snickers more than Twix.”) (Mittelman, Andrade,
Chattopadhyay, & Brendl, 2014). Similarly, when
children 4–12 years were shown the same displays
described above in the scarcity studies (e.g., a com-
bination of novel artifacts of two types), they con-
sistently selected varied to nonvaried sets (e.g.,
select A and B much more often than either two As
or two Bs). In ongoing work, we further found that
children 6–9 years assign higher monetary values to
varied sets vs. nonvaried sets (Echelbarger, Gelman,
& Maimaran, 2018). However, this preference for
variety is not limitless. In other recent work, we
have found that children (and adults) will not
forego an additional unit of a preferred food item
to obtain a varied set of foods when one food item
is preferred to another (Echelbarger et al., 2018).
Thus, a child who values broccoli and carrot sticks
equally will typically select one serving of each, but
a child who prefers carrot sticks will typically select
two servings of carrots. Thus, children’s use of vari-
ety as a cue to value (or as a decision heuristic) is
weighed against other existing preferences in chil-
dren as young as 4 years.
Taken together, scarcity and variety exert influ-
ence over item value, operating outside the proper-
ties inherent to an item itself. In the case of scarcity,
though preliminary, evidence suggests that scarcity
operates as a derived motivation that affects prefer-
ences in children and adults when combined with
additional relevant cues (e.g., authenticity, market
demand), scarcity can influence preference in both
children and adults. Variety also influences prefer-
ence, though apparently as a direct rather than
derived motivation. As our work has shown, chil-
dren as young as 4–5 years strongly prefer variety,
even in the absence of information about the items
selected themselves, and children as young as
6–9 years place higher values on varied versus
nonvaried sets of items. Knowing whether and when
children appeal to scarcity and variety offers oppor-
tunities to promote better decision-making in
childhood. For example, Albuquerque et al. (2018)
suggest that offering varied foods may promote chil-
dren’s consumption of healthy foods. In this way,
continued research examining scarcity and variety as
cues to value offers both basic and applied insights.
Conclusions
We have reviewed a rich set of construals that
affect object evaluations, including: ownership,
endowment, authenticity, purity, contamination,
scarcity, and variety. Considerations of unseen
essence, invisible history, and context affect how
much people evaluate or are willing to pay for
items across a broad range of domains (natural and
artifactual, real and virtual, durable and consum-
able). This framework can explain a wide range of
seemingly unrelated behaviors among adults: why
dog-owners pay more for a purebred than a mutt
(even though mixing breeds tends to be healthier),
why foodies pay extra for organic versus conven-
tionally farmed foods (even though the former may
be smaller or more worm-bitten), why Portlanders
saved swatches of used airport carpeting that had
sentimental value but no functional utility, or why
residents of Sandy Hook razed functional buildings
that were costly to build but were the site of a hor-
rendous crime.
Strikingly, the roots of these behaviors can be
found in early childhood. From as early as
4–5 years of age, an item’s value is not limited to
its material qualities or functional utility. In this
way, children’s early-emerging conceptual frame-
works has important implications for how objects
attain both psychological and monetary value. The
valuation of objects thus cannot be understood
strictly in terms of a theoretical framework focusing
entirely on objective outward features of objects
considered in isolation, such as color, size, behav-
iors, and/or functions. That these expectations
emerge in early childhood suggest that essence, his-
tory, and context are foundational to how people
interact with and value items.
Indeed, we suspect that the sensitivities that we
have reviewed are just the tip of the iceberg. A
highly promising direction for future research is to
examine how social learning provides a rich source
of inferences about object value that extend beyond
the item’s material qualities (e.g., Job, Nikitin,
Zhang, Carr, & Walton, 2017). These may include
social status (e.g., G€ulg€oz & Gelman, 2017), social
categories (Gaither et al., 2014; Roberts, Gelman, &
Ho, 2017), adult testimony (DeJesus, Shutts, &
Kinzler, 2017; Lumeng, Cardinal, Jankowski,
Kaciroti, & Gelman, 2008), and modeling by others
(Fawcett & Markson, 2010; Frazier, Gelman,
Kaciroti, Russell, & Lumeng, 2012).
How can we reconcile these findings with chil-
dren’s well-documented attention to salient percep-
tual features of objects? We think three points are
important here. First, although we have focused on
children’s early-emerging sensitivities, the research
literature also indicates important developmental
changes. At the very least, the scope and influence
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of hidden features, as well as the incorporation of
additional factors (e.g., market forces) increase as
children get older. We have already briefly touched
on a few of these developments (e.g., in children’s
sensitivity to authenticity, the moral history of
money, and attention to digital privacy concerns),
though certainly more studies are needed. Second
and relatedly, an early attention to essence and
object history does not mean that children pay no
attention to more salient observable features. Chil-
dren are both theorists and data-analysts (Waxman
& Gelman, 2009), and outward appearances are
striking in their own right, as well as predictive of
deeper qualities (Diesendruck & Bloom, 2003). A
growth area for future study is how children inte-
grate both perceptible and hidden properties in
their object evaluations. But third and finally, the
capacity to reason about nonobvious aspects of
experience is arguably more foundational than pre-
viously believed. For a species that is smart by
being adaptive and open to cultural learning and
social transmission of knowledge (Tomasello, 2009),
it is functionally beneficial to children to focus on
underlying causes rather than outcomes alone, to
search for hidden commonalities or new features,
and to look for cues in their social environment.
Implications for persuasion
Children’s openness to nonobvious aspects of
experience has important implications for which
messages and framings they will find most persua-
sive. Throughout this review, we have focused pri-
marily on object value, which has obvious
connections to the persuasive marketing of prod-
ucts for purchase. For example, we reviewed exten-
sive evidence that children value authenticity,
which suggests that they will be persuaded by mar-
keting that indicates that an item is authentic—real,
rare, one-of-a-kind, or otherwise not a “mere” copy,
and that they value history, which suggests that
they will be persuaded by marketing that indicates
that an item was owned or used by a high-status or
well-respected individual.
However, there are many goals of persuasion that
extend beyond marketing of products to include (for
example) increasing healthy and safe choices, com-
municating the value of education, encouraging
growth mindsets, improving financial literacy, con-
sidering privacy implication of digital devices, and
fostering positive societal values, such as increasing
environmental awareness or reducing prejudice and
stereotyping. Here, too, the literature we have
reviewed suggests that young children do not
simply rely on the loudest, brightest, simplest, or
catchiest message, but are capable of discerning
value based on more sophisticated and meaningful
cues.
Take, for example, the goal of increasing chil-
dren’s selection of healthy and varied foods in their
diet. Persuading children to eat healthy is again
open to multiple, subtle influences. As reviewed
earlier, children are more willing to eat a salad if
they had prepared it themselves (DeJesus et al.,
2019), reflecting their attention to its origins and
history. They are more willing to try a food if it
was modeled by an individual that the child sees as
“like me” – for example, same age or same gender
(Frazier et al., 2012), reflecting their attention to
social categories. Children eat more vegetables if
they are provided with a clearly articulated causal
framework for understanding why eating more var-
ied foods (including vegetables) is beneficial to the
body (Gripshover & Markman, 2013), indicating
their interest in underlying causes and not just
superficial features. Children attend to the context
in which a choice is provided, and thus are more
likely to select a varied choice of foods over a less
varied set, potentially increasing the consumption
of more healthy choices (Just, Lund, & Price, 2012;
Roe, Meengs, Birch, & Rolls, 2013). Finally, children
are highly sensitive to how a message is framed, so
that (for example) preschool age children rate food
framed as yummy more tasty than food presented
as healthy (Maimaran & Fishbach, 2014), and state-
ments that are expressed as a broad generalization
(“That’s how you do it”) imply that the behavior is
more normatively correct than statements that are
expressed as a specific statement (“That’s how I do
it”) (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2018).
Going forward, we believe that a developmental
approach will be most fruitful to determine when
children are most sensitive to the many and varied
messages they hear about the world around them—
messages that guide their choices, behaviors, and
values.
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